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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case

The

state appeals

from the

district court’s

magistrate court’s order denying Colley

W.

intermediate appellate order reversing the

Loosli’s motion to suppress.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
In April 2018, Meridian Police Ofﬁcer Robert Rodriguez parked his patrol vehicle

street

upon Which Loosli was

State’s Exhibit

1,

0:23-0:37.)

traveling

on

1;

State’s Exhibit

Exhibit

1,

1,

(R., pp.9-10;

Tn, p.14, L.21

—

p.16, L.11;

Ofﬁcer Rodriguez did not activate his overhead patrol car

block Loosli’s path, 0r order Loosli t0 stop.
L.

his bike.

(T11,

p.16, Ls.12-13; p.18, Ls.4-12; p.19, L.14

0:23 -O:37.) Nonetheless, Loosli stopped his bike near the patrol

0:23-0:37.) Ofﬁcer Rodriguez exited his vehicle and

made

0n a

lights,

— p.20,

car. (State’s

contact with Loosli. (Id.)

Approximately 30 seconds into the encounter, Ofﬁcer Rodriguez asked Loosli, “Do you

mind
1:11.)

if I see

your driver’s license,

is

that

OK With you?

Loosli complied with the request.

Or ID card?”

(State’s Exhibit

recognized the address 0n Loosli’s driver’s license as one

Department for narcotic

activities.

(Tn, p.18, Ls.13-20.)

1,

(State’s Exhibit 1, 1:05-

1:17-1:27.)

known

Within the Meridian Police

Approximately 10 seconds

obtaining Loosli’s license, Ofﬁcer Rodriguez asked Loosli if he could retain

information 0n

after that,

it.

(State’s Exhibit

1,

Ofﬁcer Rodriguez

it

after

longer to record the

1:34-1:38.) Loosli agreed. (Id.) Approximately 30 seconds

Ofﬁcer Rodriguez returned Loosli’s license

t0 him. (State’s Exhibit

1,

2:02-22 10.)

Shortly thereafter, Ofﬁcer Rodriguez asked Loosli if he could search his person for

contraband.

(State’s Exhibit

1,

reaching into his pockets. (State’s Exhibit
to take his

1,

2:28-3:05.) After Ofﬁcer Rodriguez ordered Loosli

hands out 0f his pockets, Loosli threw a dark cylindrical obj ect towards the side of the

road. (State’s Exhibit

the thrown object

3:15.)

Loosli answered in the afﬁrmative, but then began

2:28-2:45.)

The

1,

2:56-3:07.)

Ofﬁcer Rodriguez placed Loosli under

— Which he recognized

state

arrest

and recovered

as drug paraphernalia. (R., p.10; State’s Exhibit

1,

3:07-

charged Loosli with possession 0f drug paraphernalia and destruction or

concealment of evidence, both misdemeanors.

(R., pp.8—10.)

Loosli ﬁled a motion to suppress the drug paraphernalia evidence obtained during the

encounter with Ofﬁcer Rodriguez.

pp.13-18.)

(R.,

Loosli argued that Ofﬁcer Rodriguez

conducted an unreasonable seizure in Violation of the Fourth

Amendment by “approaching Mr.

Loosli, asking for identiﬁcation, retaining the identiﬁcation, and searching Mr. Loosli.” (R., pp.16-

18.)

The

state

argued that the

initial contact,

Loosli’s handing of his license to Ofﬁcer Rodriguez,

and Loosli’s agreement to allow Ofﬁcer Rodriguez
(R., pp.36-39;

to brieﬂy retain the license

were

all

consensual.

TL, p.27, L.23 — p.30, L.1.) After a hearing, the magistrate court denied the motion

to suppress, concluding that Loosli’s contact

consensual and did not constitute a Fourth

with Ofﬁcer Rodriguez prior t0 his formal arrest was

Amendment

seizure.

(R., p.40; Tr., p.30,

L.22 — p.31,

L.5.)

Loosli entered a conditional guilty pleal t0 possession of drug paraphernalia, and the state

dismissed the destruction or concealment of evidence charge. (R., pp.42-43.) Loosli appealed t0
the district court. (R., pp.60-62.)

had made
In

The parties made

similar arguments to the district court that they

t0 the magistrate court. (R., pp.83-89, 95-106, 111-1 15.)

its

intermediate appellate capacity, the district court reversed the magistrate court’s order

denying Loosli’s motion t0 suppress.
contact with Ofﬁcer Rodriguez

(R.,

pp.119-128.) The court concluded that Loosli’s

was consensual

(R., p. 127),

initial

but that Ofﬁcer Rodriguez conducted

an unreasonable seizure in Violation of the Fourth Amendment by obtaining and retaining Loosli’s
license (R., pp.126-127).

1

The

state

timely appealed. (R., pp.129-13 1 .)

Loosli’s written guilty plea identiﬁed his plea as being “conditional,” but also contained a

checkmark

in the

box

indicating that with the plea, Loosli

was “waiving

certain important rights

such as...[t]0 appeal this conviction, although the sentence may be appealed.” (R., p.42.) The
state did not, in the course 0f the intermediate appeal, subsequently assert that Loosli had waived
his appellate rights.

ISSUE
Did

the district court err

to suppress?

by reversing

the magistrate court’s order denying Loosli’s motion

ARGUMENT
The

District

Court Erred

BV Reversing The Magistrate

Court’s Order Denying Loosli’s Motion

To Suppress
A.

Introduction

The
after

district court

reversed the magistrate court’s order denying Loosli’s motion to suppress

concluding that Ofﬁcer Rodriguez conducted a Fourth Amendment seizure by requesting and

then brieﬂy retaining Loosli’s identiﬁcation Without adequate justiﬁcation. (R., pp. 126- 127.) The
district court erred

because an ofﬁcer does not seize an individual simply by requesting that he

provide identiﬁcation. Further, a review 0f the record reveals that Loosli consented both t0 Ofﬁcer

Rodriguez’s

meet

his

initial

burden

review of his license, and to his brief retention 0f it. Loosli therefore failed t0

t0 demonstrate that a Fourth

Amendment

seizure occurred prior to his formal

arrest.

B.

Standard

Of Review

On review

of a decision rendered by a

district court in its

intermediate appellate capacity,

the reviewing court “directly revieW[s] the district court’s decision.”

709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Losser

758 (2008)).

If the district court properly applied the

the district court’s order.

mQ

(citing

V.

State V. DeWitt, 145 Idaho

Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d

law t0 the

facts the appellate court Will

LLser, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls

V.

afﬁrm

Blaser,

102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 (1981)).

The standard 0f review 0f a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision 0n a motion
t0 suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s

ﬁndings of fact that are

supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application 0f constitutional principles
t0 those facts.

State V. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006).

Loosli’s Contact

C.

With Ofﬁcer Rodriguez Was Consensual

The Fourth Amendment

to the U.S. Constitution prohibits unreasonable seizures.

The

exclusionary rule requires the suppression of both “primary evidence obtained as a direct result 0f

an

illegal search 0r seizure”

illegality.”

State V.

and “evidence

later

discovered and found t0 be derivative 0f an

Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 720, 404 P.3d 659, 662 (2017).

However, “[a]n encounter between a law enforcement ofﬁcer and a
Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless

it is

nonconsensual.” State

211 P.3d 91, 95 (2009) (citations omitted).

T0

V.

Willoughbv, 147 Idaho 482, 486,

constitute a Fourth

Amendment seizure,

must, “by means 0f physical force or show of authority,” in some

liberty.

Li. (citing State V. Nickel,

under

is

required, the encounter

122 Idaho 100, 102, 831 P.2d 942, 944

all

way

restrain

134 Idaho 610, 612, 7 P.3d 219, 221 (2000)).

ofﬁcer conveys a message that compliance

m,

citizen does not trigger

(Ct.

is

an individual’s

Thus, unless the

deemed consensual.

App. 1991). The proper inquiry

the circumstances surrounding an encounter, a reasonable person

would have

leave or otherwise decline the ofﬁcer’s requests and terminate the encounter.

Idaho 841, 844, 103 P.3d 454, 457 (2004) (quoting State

V.

the ofﬁcer

is

m

whether,

felt free t0

State V. Page, 140

Reese, 132 Idaho 652, 654, 978 P.2d

212, 214 (1999)). However, feeling “free t0 leave” must be distinguished from one’s willingness
t0 actually leave.

While most

citizens Will

and do so without being told they are

respond to a police request, the fact that people do

so,

free not t0 respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature

0fthe response. State

V.

V.

Nelson, 134 Idaho 675, 679, 8 P.3d 670, 674 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing

M

Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984).)
“[A] request for identiﬁcation 0r mere questioning

a seizure.” State

“This

is

V.

is

not enough,

itselﬂ,] to constitute

Landreth, 139 Idaho 986, 990, 88 P.3d 1226, 1230 (2004) (citations omitted).

so because the person approached need not answer any question put t0

decline t0 listen t0 the questions at

all

and go about his business.” State

520, 523-524, 826 P.2d 481, 484-485 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing Florida

498 (1983));
that

by

ﬂ m,
211$

134 Idaho

he had committed a crime.

.

.

at

V.

V.

him and may

Osborne, 121 Idaho

Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-

613, 7 P.3d at 222 (“[E]Ven Without reasonable suspicion

[i]nterr0gating

a person concerning his identiﬁcation 0r

requesting identiﬁcation does not, without more, constitute a seizure.” (citing

D_elg@, 466 U.S.

at 216)).

When

a defendant seeks t0 suppress evidence allegedly obtained as a result of an illegal

seizure, the

burden ofproving that a seizure occurred

103 P.3d

456.

at

is

on the defendant. Egg, 140 Idaho

at

843,

In this case, the district court ﬁrst correctly concluded that the initial contact between

Ofﬁcer Rodriguez and Loosli was consensual.

(R., p.127.)

The court

also noted that Loosli

was

not challenging any aspect of the encounter that occurred after Ofﬁcer Rodriguez returned Loosli’s
license to him.

this

appeal

is

(R., p.123.)

Therefore, the relevant portion 0f the encounter for the purposes 0f

the approximately one minute that elapsed between

requested Loosli’s identiﬁcation and

When he

returned

it.

when Ofﬁcer Rodriguez

(ﬂ State’s Exhibit

1,

1:07-22 10.)

In analyzing this portion ofthe encounter, the district court erred by: (1) accepting Loosli’s

argument

that

Amendment

any request for identiﬁcation Without proper justiﬁcation constituted a Fourth

seizure;

and

(2)

concluding that Ofﬁcer Rodriguez’s brief retention, with consent, 0f

Loosli’s license constituted an extension 0fthat seizure. (R., pp. 126-127.) This

(1) as

was

error because:

noted above, a police ofﬁcer’s request for an individual’s identiﬁcation in the context of

consensual encounter, Without more, does not constitute a Fourth

review of the

totality

Amendment

seizure;

and

(2) a

of circumstances reveals that neither Ofﬁcer Rodriguez’s request for the

identiﬁcation, nor his request t0 brieﬂy retain the license to record

seizure. Loosli therefore failed to

meet

its

contents constituted a

his burden.

In his brieﬁng before the magistrate and district courts, Loosli did not speciﬁcally argue

that the

manner

constituted a

required.

0f,

or circumstances surrounding, Ofﬁcer Rodriguez’s request for identiﬁcation

show 0f

Instead,

authority that

relying

would convey

on Egg, Loosli argued

identiﬁcation itself constituted a Fourth

adequate justiﬁcation.

(R., pp.17-18,

Amendment
66-68,

Rodriguez merely “asked” for his identiﬁcation.

Egg

t0 a reasonable

as holding that “a seizure occurred

that

person that compliance was

Ofﬁcer Rodriguez’s request for

seizure because

112-115.)

it

was not supported by

Loosli acknowledged that Ofﬁcer

66, 112.)

However, Loosli interpreted

when an ofﬁcer asked an

individual for identiﬁcation

(R., pp.

1

8,

without a ‘compelling need to seize the identiﬁcation and run a warrants check.” (R., p.66

(emphasis added);

The

ﬂ alﬂ
that

1

p.112 n.1,)

district court correctly

cam Video conﬁrm

n.

recognized that “Ofﬁcer Rodriguez’s testimony and his body

he asked [Loosli]

if

he could see his driver’s license.”

(R., p.125.)

However, the court seemingly accepted Loosli’s argument “that when Ofﬁcer Rodriguez asked
and received the driver’s
acknowledging

license,

that Loosli

an investigative detention occurred.”

was not “ordered”

determinative that “[t]he license

to

for

While

(R., p.123.)

produce the identiﬁcation, the court found

was obtained and held for no apparent reason except curiosity and

ﬁshing for leads t0 something that is unidentiﬁed in the record,” and that “[p]01iteness and phrasing
should not diminish the right to be

left

alone except for an articulable reason.” (R, p.127.)

Loosli and the district court have misinterpreted

m

did not overrule

Egg.

In

and the well-established principle

identiﬁcation, Without more, does not constitute a Fourth

Supreme Court noted that the ofﬁcer’s

initial

Supreme Court

Egg,

the Idaho

that

an ofﬁcer’s request for

Amendment

seizure.

While the Idaho

encounter with Page was consensual,

it

also

the district court’s conclusion that the ofﬁcer’s contact with and questioning of

afﬁrmed

Page was

accomplished pursuant t0 the ofﬁcer’s community caretaking function. Egg, 140 Idaho
103 P.3d
in

at

457. The ofﬁcer obtained Page’s driver’s license after determining that Page

need of assistance, and

was obtained and

thus, the reason for the encounter

was over before

the warrants check run. Li. at 845, 103 P.3d at 458.

From

at 844,

was not

the driver’s license

this point, the

assumed, without expressly analyzing, that the ofﬁcer had “seized” Page’s identiﬁcation.
844-845, 103 P.3d

at

457-458. Ultimately,

rule “that in the absence 0f

Amendment

Egg rested

Li. at

holding on the long-standing general

any basis for suspecting an individual of misconduct, the Fourth

generally does not allow governmental agents to detain an individual and

identiﬁcation.” Li. at 845, 103 P.3d at 458 (citing

added).

its

Court

Brown V.

demand

Texas, 44 U.S. 47 (1979)) (emphasis

Loosli’s reading of

precedent that even
generally

ask

When

at

is

contrary to the long and well-established federal appellate

ofﬁcers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they

individual

the

Delgado, 466 U.S.

Page

216; United States

requested, but did not

demand

and ask

questions

V.

to

examine

E,

identiﬁcation.

t0 see the respondent’s identiﬁcation

and

ticket.

Such conduct

M

Dragon, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002) (“Even when law enforcement ofﬁcers have n0 basis

for suspecting a particular individual, they

may pose

questions, ask for identiﬁcation, and request

consent to search luggage—provided they d0 not induce cooperation by coercive means.”);
States V. Shield,

789 F.3d 733, 744

change a voluntary

stop,

Which

is

investigatory stop”); United States

(7th Cir.

outside the purview 0f the Fourth

V.

street 0r in

proper question

Amendment

is

initial

Amendment,

Caraballo, 595 F.3d 1214, 1223 (11th Cir. 2010)

Amendment simply by approaching an

some other public place and asking a question or asking

Because the

M

2015) (“A mere request for identiﬁcation does not

enforcement ofﬁcers do not Violate the Fourth

0n the

gg,

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980) (“[DEA agents]

Without more, did not amount t0 an intrusion upon any constitutionally protected interest”);
States V.

may

into

an

(“Law

individual

for identiﬁcation”).

encounter between Ofﬁcer Rodriguez and Loosli was consensual, the

not whether identiﬁcation was requested, but, as with any other alleged Fourth

seizure,

whether the defendant has met his burden, under a review of the

the circumstances, t0 demonstrate that the police conduct

totality

would have communicated

0f

t0 a

reasonable person that he was not at liberty t0 ignore the request or police presence and g0 about
his business. Willoughby, 147 Idaho at 486, 211 P.3d at 95.

10

The

district court

did not identify any

facts,

and none are evident from the record,

a Fourth

Amendment

that

would

constitute a

show of authority indicative of

seizure.

In a totality 0f the circumstances analysis, a review 0f the context

statement, “can

I

see your identiﬁcation”

individual pulled over

engaged

by an ofﬁcer

means something completely

in a patrol vehicle than

in a consensual contact With the ofﬁcer.

it

would

is critical.

An ofﬁcer’s

different to a reasonable

to a reasonable individual

Therefore, a court must be careful t0 decline

invitations to

misapply precedent in which similar ofﬁcer statements were used t0 compel

individuals to

hand over

case.

their identiﬁcation in a different type

of context than

is

present in this

In this case, Ofﬁcer Rodriguez’s request for identiﬁcation in the course 0f a consensual

contact, without more, could not constitute a seizure

Because

it

— and

Loosli failed to demonstrate “more.”

concluded that Loosli was seized When Ofﬁcer Rodriguez obtained his license,

the district court did not need t0 speciﬁcally analyze whether

0f the license to record

its

contents itself would have constituted a Fourth

Loosli not already been seized. The court, however, did

held for n0 articulated reason.” (R.,

p.

was an unlawful

Egg, however, and
obtaining

it,

the

manner

are easily distinguished

ﬁnd

Amendment

that the license

it

for a dispatch

seizure

had

“was requested and

127 (emphasis added).) The court also noted

“[t]aking the driver’s license and holding

caretaking ﬁmction and

Ofﬁcer Rodriguez’s brief retention

that, in

Egg,

check exceeded the community

seizure.” (R., p. 126.)

in

Which the ofﬁcer retained the license

from the circumstances 0f the present

in that case after

case.

There

is

no

indication that Page expressly consented t0 the ofﬁcer’s retention 0f his license for the purposes

of conducting a warrants check. Page, 140 Idaho

11

at

842-845, 103 P.3d

at

455-458. Additionally,

in

Egg,

making

the ofﬁcer took the license back with

it

him

to his patrol vehicle to

impossible for Page t0 either ask the ofﬁcer t0 return his license, 0r t0 leave the area

without leaving his license behind.

I_d.

at

843, 103 P.3d at 456. To the contrary, in the present case,

Ofﬁcer Rodriguez speciﬁcally requested permission
recording the information

it

t0 retain Loosli’s license for the

contained, stayed with Loosli as he

was recording

and then promptly returned the license upon the completion 0f this
2:07.)

task.

purpose 0f

this information,

(State’s Exhibit

1,

1:34-

Loosli never withdrew his consent or asked the ofﬁcer to return his license in the brief

period that Ofﬁcer Rodriguez possessed
Exhibit

check for warrants,

1,

1:07-2:07.)

was returned
then, after

it,

despite having the opportunity to do so.

(E State’s

Loosli had yet another opportunity t0 end the encounter after the license

to him, but again declined t0

d0

he had regained possession of his

towards the side 0f the road, resulting in his

(E State’s Exhibit

so.

license, that Loosli

arrest.

(m

id.)

1,

2:04-3: 15.)

It

was only

threw the drug paraphernalia

Therefore, Ofﬁcer Rodriguez’s brief

retention of Loosli’s license, done with permission, did not constitute a Fourth

Amendment

seizure.

Loosli consented t0 both Ofﬁcer Rodriguez’s examination of his license, and his brief
retention of the license to record

constitute a Fourth

Amendment

its

contents.

Because these requests, without more, did not

seizure, the district court erred in concluding otherwise

reversing the magistrate court’s denial 0f Loosli’s motion t0 suppress.

12

and

CONCLUSION
The

Court reverse the

state respectﬁllly requests that this

district court’s

magistrate court’s order denying Loosli’s motion t0 suppress and

remand

order reversing the

this case for further

proceedings.

DATED this

12th day ofAugust, 2019.
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Mark W. Olson
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